Editors Note: This article comes fromBeep News (ID: gh_2279df4d40e5)Editors Note: This article comes from
Beep News (ID: gh_2279df4d40e5)
, Author: YY, reproduced by Odaily with authorization.
Friends who are familiar with BM should know that from the earliest Bitshares, to Steemit later, to EOS today, the biggest problem or unstable element of BM projects is often BM itself.
BM is a person who has always had a lot of ideas, ideas, and loves to hate people. Propose a plan today, and talk about an idea tomorrow, but which one can be implemented and which one is reliable? Always in a trance, making people unpredictable.
Not long ago (October 15, local time), BM published a long article on his Medium blog, expounding on his improvement proposal for the governance model on the EOS chain. I heard that EOS led the decline on the day the article was published. It is true that he is a ruthless person...
But jokes are jokes. As far as the facts are concerned, it is not a matter of a day or two for BM to reveal his intention to reform the governance model and plan for it. A lot of attention and discussion.
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BM called you to lock up for ten years?
Regarding the governance improvement plan proposed by BM, the author made a simple summary. Of course, if your English is better or you don’t mind listening to beating around the bush, you are also welcome to read the original text of BM directly. The link to the original text is as follows:
The improvement method involved in the article mainly includes two parts, one is node voting, and the other is node reward. First, a few aspects about voting:
① EOS pledged to REX no longer enjoys voting rights, but still retains network resource rent, auction and other income. (This scheme will make each EOS in REX correspond to more network resources)
②Add 6 new voting pledge pools corresponding to different lock-up time limits. Only those who pledge EOS tokens in these pledge pools will have voting rights, and the corresponding periods of the 6 pledge pools are 3 months, 6 months, 1 Years, 2 years, 5 years and 10 years. Obviously, the longer the time, the greater the voting weight. In addition, according to the first article, we can know that once the token is put into the pledge pool, it will withdraw from the REX resource pool at the same time, and the two are mutually exclusive.
③Each pledge pool can get 0.5% of the additional issuance of EOS as pledge interest every year. According to the overall magnitude of 1 billion, each pledge pool can get about 5 million EOS. The specific distribution of interest will be dynamically adjusted according to market conditions. For a simple example, assuming that a total of 1 million EOS is pledged in a 10-year pledge pool, each EOS pledged will be allocated 5 EOS Rewards, but if the total amount of pledges is 10 million EOS, then the reward allocated to each EOS is only 0.5 EOS.
④Users can withdraw assets from the staking pool at most once a week, but different staking pools have different withdrawal ratios. For example, about 7% of the assets in the 3-month staking pool can be withdrawn per week, while the 10-year staking pool In the assets, only about 0.2% can be withdrawn every week. (It can be seen as a process of gradually unlocking pledged assets, 3 months or about 100 days, unlocking 1% every day, and naturally 7% a week)
⑤Short-term pledges can be directly converted into long-term pledges, such as switching from a 3-month pledge pool to a 10-year pledge pool. This process can be carried out at any time, but this process is not reversible, that is, long-term pledges cannot be converted into short-term pledges at any time. Unless you can live with only converting 0.2% per week.
⑥The voting system of voters is changed from the original 1 vote 30 to 1 vote 1 vote.
⑦ In addition, BM also specifically emphasized that the bribing behavior and even buying votes behaviors of participating nodes in order to attract votes for voters have no moral problems. On the contrary, those who try to prevent bribery and buying votes Behavior is an act that violates the legitimate rights of others.
Then there are several aspects about node rewards:
⑨Or cancel the node’s block reward, that is, change the node’s revenue composition from the original block reward + voting revenue to include only voting revenue. (Block rewards can only be obtained by the top 21 super nodes)
⑩The nodes that lose blocks will face the penalty of reducing the income, and the voters of these nodes will also lose part of the income because they voted for unreliable nodes.
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clear intent and possible outcomes
The 6 pledge pools with different lock-up times and the corresponding different voting weights obviously intend to bind the operation of the entire EOS network with those deep participants to a greater extent - the more tokens you hold, the more The more votes you have when you vote; the longer you stake your tokens, the higher the weight of your votes when you vote.
And BMs recognition of election bribery and ticket buying is, in a sense, strongly linking the interests of deep participants with the operation of the EOS network, because in this mode, a large number of EOS holders and long-term Holders will have greater influence on the voting of super nodes, and the elected nodes will naturally provide them with more generous dividends.
In addition, according to the description in the original text, the change of voting weight will also have a huge direct impact on the exchanges participating in node voting. Because exchanging voting rights means long-term pledge of tokens in the pledge pool, and the minimum lock-up time corresponding to the pledge pool is 3 months, and the longest time is even as long as 10 years. For exchanges, it is difficult for them to vote with users coins.
However, whether the right to speak of the exchange will be significantly reduced because of this model, I am afraid that we will have to wait until these plans are actually implemented. After all, the long-term accumulation of coins in the hands of the exchange is also a considerable amount.
The main purpose of changing the original rule of 1 vote and 30 votes to 1 vote and 1 vote is to reduce the centralized control of nodes.
As we all know, EOS’s super node system has been questioned since its birth because of its over-centralization. Controversy and even accusations, overseas communities even spread the statement that the Chinese consortium is the chief culprit for the over-centralization of EOS.
It is an indisputable fact that the super nodes themselves have a strong centralization feature, but if one vote and one vote can be implemented, at least one organization or a small number of organizations control multiple nodes can be alleviated to a certain extent.
From the perspective of long-term development, it can be said that the system of taking punitive measures against unstable nodes and jointly punishing coin holders who voted for this node can be said to be a very constructive improvement plan, because these plans increase EOS Risk sharing among the network, nodes and investors.
The meaning of risk sharing is easy to understand. It is said that this term was first proposed by Buffett, which refers to the companys executives buying their own stocks out of their own pockets. In this way, the operation and development of the company will be managed by a group of people who share the interests of the company. To put it bluntly, it is to make the important employees of the company and the company itself become grasshoppers on the same rope.
For better development, EOS chooses to expand the scale of rewards and punish dereliction of duty nodes, while nodes provide dividends to users in order to qualify for the top 21, and users tend to vote for better and more stable nodes in order to seek long-term benefits , Such an approach will in turn promote the development of EOS, forming an introverted virtuous circle and binding interests.
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Both BM and Block.ones CEO BB expressed willingness for governance reform
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BM’s governance modification proposals published successively on blogs and Twitter not only triggered discussions among EOS followers, but also received positive replies and responses from EOS Force and EOS main node EOS New York.
EOSForce replied under the original blog, saying that most of the amendments proposed by BM, as EOSIO’s first parachain, EOSForce, have already been realized, including: pledge pools corresponding to different lock-up times And it can switch from short-term to long-term at any time, lock-up voting dividends, 1-vote-1-voting system, and punish nodes that lose blocks, etc.
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The specific reply of EOS force
EOS New York followed BM and published their own transition proposal. The summary of the proposal is as follows:
① Replace dynamic inflation with static inflation (such as modifying 5% additional issuance to fixed value additional issuance).
② Replace 1 vote with 30 votes with divisible votes.
③Staking or lending to REX will provide rewards to the account.
④ Accounts voting for nodes will transfer 50% of the inflation away from themselves, 10% of which will be burned and 40% will be sent to the node reward pool.
⑤ If too few tokens are voted, the reward will be turned off, the total inflation will be reduced, and the existing 100% inflation will be awarded to the node until the voting threshold is reached again.
⑥ Decentralization tokens and voting tokens that do not interfere with each other can be set in one account.
⑦Node income and voting rewards are replaced by the corresponding proportional salary by grade.
⑧The performance of nodes determines the total inflation in any given period, which can seriously affect the returns of all stakeholders.
