23.7万用户也救不了StandX，Perp DEX进入淘汰赛
Original | Odaily (@OdailyChina)
Author | Golem (@web 3_golem)
On October 15, decentralized perpetual contract platform StandX announced it was ceasing operations, canceling its planned platform token issuance, and planning to distribute a one-time airdrop to users in DUSD. The airdrop eligibility checker will open on October 26, with users able to claim between November 1 and December 31. There will be no lock-up restrictions after claiming.
According to StandX's official information, since its mainnet launch in November 2025, the platform has served over 237,000 users cumulatively, with TVL once exceeding $200 million. StandX was no unknown player in the Perp DEX sector, yet it has still reached the point of shutting down.
StandX's exit provides a new case study for the intensifying Perp DEX competition. Perp DEX remains one of the sectors with the strongest trading demand in the crypto market, but sector growth no longer means all participants can get a slice of the pie.
Subsidies Have Raised Perp DEX Customer Acquisition Costs
Over the past two years, as Hyperliquid proved out the growth path for on-chain perpetual contracts, more and more projects have flooded into this sector. New platforms keep emerging, and the battle over liquidity and users has intensified. Competition among platforms has also evolved from early-stage product innovation and liquidity battles to multi-front contests spanning trading costs, user incentives, and business models.
Among these, fee subsidies are a direct and effective customer acquisition and growth tool. For perpetual contract users who trade frequently, fees are a significant factor affecting trading costs. Platforms can attract user migration by reducing fees, rebating trading costs, and offering market maker incentives. For new platforms that have yet to build brand recognition, this strategy is particularly effective in generating short-term results.
But when all competitors begin adopting similar strategies, fee subsidies cease to be a differentiated advantage and gradually become a necessary cost of market entry.
Take the three leading Perp DEXs — Hyperliquid, Aster, and Lighter — as examples. All three are returning fee revenue to users in different ways. Generally speaking, Hyperliquid reduces user trading costs through referral code discounts (4%), HYPE staking discounts (5-40%), and market maker rebates; Aster offers a 5% discount for paying fees with ASTER (spot only), tiered volume-based discounts, and referral rebates; Lighter adopts zero fees in certain trading scenarios and expands its user base through referral rebate mechanisms.
More fundamentally, the remaining revenue still cannot go into Perp DEXs' own pockets — it is returned to the community through token buybacks. According to CoinShares data, approximately 99% of Hyperliquid's platform fees flow into the assistance fund for HYPE buybacks; 99% of Aster's daily platform fees are used to buy back ASTER, all distributed to veASTER stakers; Lighter uses protocol revenue (paid accounts, liquidation fees, and stablecoin reserve yields) to buy back LIT.
Trading volume of top three Perp DEX platforms
Leading platforms already possess trading experience, market depth, and user bases. When they are simultaneously offering hefty fee subsidies, new platforms can only subsidize even more aggressively for users to have sufficient incentive to migrate, thereby driving up customer acquisition costs.
However, this "endless" subsidy war is something mid-tier Perp DEXs cannot afford to sustain. In its shutdown announcement, StandX stated that most of its revenue had already been returned to users through SIP-2 and SIP-3, and this airdrop required the team to invest additional funds.
Moreover, fee subsidies are not the only cost Perp DEXs must bear. To give new platforms sufficient market depth, they need to attract market makers to provide liquidity; to achieve growth, they need substantial trading rewards and marketing; to maintain competitiveness, they need continuous product development, trading infrastructure maintenance, and risk management improvements.
These expenditures combined mean that the growth cost of a Perp DEX extends far beyond the difference between fee revenue and incentive spending shown on data platforms.
Once subsidies begin, they are hard to stop. Any Perp DEX wanting to restore normal fees may face public pressure and user migration pressure. Under the cost squeeze from leading Perp DEX platforms, it has become nearly impossible for new market entrants to turn a profit.
Airdrops Can Generate Trading Volume, But Not Trading Demand
Beyond fee subsidies, points and airdrops are another important way for new Perp DEX projects to attract early users. However, the marginal utility of airdrop incentives for project teams is also declining rapidly.
In the crypto industry, a trading platform that has not yet issued a token can attract a large number of users simply by launching a points program and hinting at possible future token distribution. StandX's early ability to garner significant attention was directly driven by users' FOMO from missing out on Hyperliquid and Aster.
But the problem is that airdrop incentives can create trading activity, but cannot create stable trading demand. After a project's TGE, users immediately withdraw their funds. This creates a gap between surface-level prosperity and operational reality — high trading volume, but disloyal traders; impressive-looking TVL, but capital that could leave at any moment.
After years of points campaigns and token TGEs, airdrop incentives have long since become a collusion between project teams and airdrop farmers. After a project's TGE, users will move their funds and activity out of the protocol without any hesitation. From some project teams' perspective, issuing a token to harvest one last wave has become the realistic choice. Projects like StandX that actively refuse to issue a token and choose to shut down have instead become the minority.
Perp DEX Enters the Elimination Round
This does not mean new platforms have no opportunities. Perp DEX remains the sector with the greatest growth potential in crypto.
It is just that the market is eliminating those boring projects that treat subsidies, liquidity incentives, and airdrop expectations as their primary customer acquisition tools; the market still craves Perp DEXs with genuine product capabilities, network effects, and business models. For example, PaperTrade received spontaneous analysis and enthusiastic following from players as soon as it launched.
For startup teams still at the table, product capability beyond subsidies is the only variable that matters going forward.
